Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen edited the English translation of Gossen's book The Laws of Human Relations (1983), and wrote a lengthy introduction to it. His highly appreciative, thoroughly documented study has become a major reference on an otherwise little known early writer. It suggests that Gossen was unjustly ignored by his contemporaries, just as Georgescu-Roegen felt that his own contributions to economics were insufficiently recognized.
1.

Introduction
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1906 -1994 ) is mostly remembered today for his work on bioeconomics and its implications on natural resources management, sustainability, and growth. In the first decades of his career, he had also extensively investigated utility theory and consumer choice on the one hand, and production theory on the other, contributing substantially to both areas (see for a synthesis Maneschi and Zamagni 1997) . His hope to receive, and belief that he fully deserved, the Nobel Prize -which he never did -was one that he widely voiced among colleagues at Vanderbilt University, especially towards the end of his career. And it was precisely in this period that he made a major contribution to history of
economics, with the English edition of Hermann Heinrich Gossen's book The Laws of Human Relations and the Rules of Human Action Derived Therefrom (1983).
Georgescu-Roegen's lengthy, thoroughly documented introductory essay to Gossen's book has become a key reference on an otherwise obscure older writer. Gossen, customarily classified among early marginalist authors, was a German civil servant with hardly any ties to academic institutions. His book, written in isolation in over twenty years and published at his expense in 1854, failed to attract any attention and, despite some posthumous praise (most notably by William S. Jevons and Léon Walras), it has remained relatively little known.
Georgescu-Roegen's essay conveys a distinctive sense of empathy between the author and his object of study. The reader can hardly escape the feeling that Gossen was unjustly ignored by his contemporaries, just as Georgescu-Roegen himself felt that his own contribution to economics was insufficiently recognized. His aspiration to win the Nobel Prize even appears 4 between the lines -it was not much through historical work per se that he was trying to attract attention towards his credentials, but in a much subtler way.
But Georgescu-Roegen's venture into history of economics is not only a story of personal feelings, let alone vanity. It was Gossen's approach to consumer theory and utility that had triggered his enthusiasm in the first place. In previous writings, Georgescu-Roegen had sketched a novel approach to better incorporate time (and with it, the effects of experience and learning) into consumer models. Gossen's own emphasis on time, human experience, and the finiteness of time as the fundamental source of economic scarcity, resonated with his own views.
Georgescu-Roegen realized that some of Gossen's ideas on time had gone almost unnoticed before, and had potential for further exploitation. The book project was, in fact, part of his broader theoretical and analytical effort to renew the economics of consumer choice and utility.
In this article, I set out to reconstitute the unfolding of Georgescu-Roegen's project to advance his own ideas with support of hints found in Gossen, the obstacles he encountered, and the changes in perspective, approach and focus he was led to make. To the best of my knowledge, there are no previous, systematic historical studies of this important episode in Georgescu-Roegen's intellectual career.
I show that completion of Georgescu-Roegen's editorial undertaking took almost twenty years and was highly convoluted -sharing a similar, unfortunate destiny with its own object, Gossen's original book. During this time, Georgescu-Roegen's outlook progressively changed:
initially strong theoretical interests for consumer choice models eventually faded away, owing to his particular circumstances as well as to logical difficulties that emerged as analysis progressed. Meanwhile, the motive of self-identification with Gossen gradually gained 5 prominence. Still, Georgescu-Roegen never kept it confined to the personal sphere, and rather brought forth a universal perspective: he transcended his own affinities with Gossen to develop a far-reaching reflection on the place of knowledge and discovery in societies, past and present.
His use of historical research to illuminate similarities between individual destinies across time and space became a means to reveal and comprehend social regularities more generally.
What, then, of the initially intended role of history of thought -that of supporting economic model-building? Undoubtedly, Georgescu-Roegen derived substantial insight from his increasingly intimate knowledge of Gossen's book. He decidedly rejected the neoclassical consumer models and their graphical representations in modern textbooks in favor of Gossen's, which took account of the effects of the passage of time on consumer preferences and behaviors. Unfortunately, he was unable to go much beyond Gossen in attempting to formally incorporate time and its effects in consumer theory -which is one of the reasons why his attention eventually shifted to the entirely different issue of scientific discovery in society.
The Gossen publication project: a dramatic story
The published work -as can be consulted today -is a masterly example of the editing of economics texts and more generally, of history of economics scholarship. It is a joint enterprise of Georgescu-Roegen and his colleague Rudolph C. Blitz, who was also at Vanderbilt and was a native speaker of German. Blitz always acknowledged (in private correspondence as well as in his foreword to the book) that it was Georgescu-Roegen who first had the idea of working at the book and proposed it to him. . Hayek, who had himself written an introduction to a German edition of Gossen's book fifty years earlier, congratulated Georgescu-Roegen for the quality of his work in a letter in which he confessed being "a little ashamed" for not having done an equally valuable job: "Wholly inexperienced in the job of editing as I then was (at 27 years of age) I did my best to collect all available information, but did not even have time to re-read the book whose importance I had recognized but which I had never really closely studied" 20 .
There is little doubt that this long interval was largely determined by practical obstacles.
Blitz occasionally lamented his colleague's lack of constancy and engagement in a project that he had himself launched 21 , but the linguistic barrier and Georgescu-Roegen's dependence on Blitz's translation account for his delay to a large extent. Blitz himself found the translation much more challenging and time-consuming than he initially expected ("the task of the translation turned out to be much more difficult than we originally anticipated" and even to search for potential descendants -in particular a "Gossen" firm in Erlangen, first mentioned to him by Hayek but probably unrelated 26 . The loss of the contract with Kelley, busy schedules and competing writing commitments -notably with Georgescu-Roegen's research on bioeconomics, very active throughout the 1970s -add to the impediments.
Georgescu-Roegen's evolving view of Gossen
During this long period, did Georgescu-Roegen's attitudes towards Gossen and his expectations for the editorial project change? I now discuss the emergence of a sense of commonality of destinies between Georgescu-Roegen and his object of study, and I show that it becomes detectable only at a relatively late stage in the history of the project. I subsequently provide evidence that Georgescu-Roegen's initial motivation was theoretical and focused on the renewal of consumer theory; this interest was strongest at the very beginning, though, and lost intensity over time.
The late emergence of a sense of shared destinies
The published version of the introductory essay opens with an "exordium" of about twenty pages entitled "Are there minds that may think above their time?" In a nutshell, the argument is as follows. In his History of Economic Analysis, Schumpeter judged that some economists including Gossen "wrote above their times"; so did Böhm-Bawerk (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xii).
Yet this very possibility is "in direct contradiction to […] the 'sociology of knowledge'" of Robert K. Merton and others (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xii). Georgescu-Roegen did not conceal his criticisms of what he saw as the main tenet of this discipline, namely "the inevitability of any 11 discovery when the existentialist basis is just ripe for it" (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xii) or more sarcastically, the idea that "Hamlet would have had to be written by someone else had
Shakespeare not existed" (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xiii). Admittedly, Georgescu-Roegen criticized this tenet in its strongest form and gave little consideration to any nuances that sociologists of knowledge may have introduced, but an appraisal of the accuracy of his argument would be beyond the scope of this article. Here, it is rather important to stress his claim that multiple discoveries are no more likely to be observed than "singletons". Discovery is so complex that what seems at first sight to be similar may in fact not be so. Take the JevonsMenger-Walras triad, typically credited to have brought about the so-called marginalist revolution: a closer look at their respective works reveals that they are very dissimilar, and "it was only much later that their contributions were consolidated into the general law as we know it today" (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xvii). As a matter of fact, he insisted, we are much more likely to observe singletons: "any discovery, small or great, must, by definition, be in some sense above its time" (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xviii). Precisely for this reason, it is all the more likely to face hostility, incomprehension, or oblivion -as was the case with Gossen.
Interestingly, this exordium was absent from the earlier drafts of 1973 and 1976, which all started with a much shorter introduction of about two pages: hence, it must have been added in 1982, just before publication. To be sure, the previous drafts also expressed regret for the neglect of Gossen, and reproached economists for failing to recognize his merits. Yet in the early stages of the project, Georgescu-Roegen's focus was on the peculiar fate of one particularly unlucky man. His switch to a wider sociological reflection and the reference to Merton in the final version of 1982 suggest instead that he was adopting a universal perspective: Gossen's 12 destiny may not have been unique but rather the expression of a social regularity, revealing some deeper tendency in the way in which human communities organize the production and dissemination of knowledge. In this sense, his may be the destiny of all "minds above their times" -including Georgescu-Roegen himself. It was only at this late stage, then, that the personal motive of self-identification with Gossen gained relevance, visibility, and even scientific dignity as it was incorporated in a broader reflection on knowledge and society.
Theoretical affinities fade away with time
If Georgescu-Roegen's sense of self-identification with Gossen and its sociological legitimation Georgescu-Roegen had already done on utility theory; then I present Gossen's contribution, placing emphasis on the points that Georgescu-Roegen discussed most extensively; and finally, I
assess the achievements and limitations of Georgescu-Roegen's endeavor on Gossen.
Georgescu-Roegen's approach to consumer theory
By the time he started working at the Gossen project, Georgescu-Roegen had written extensively on utility theory and made substantial contributions to the topic. A first, authoritative article was published in 1936 on the so-called integrability problem in demand theory. In sum, the question under scrutiny was whether it would be possible to recover indifference maps from the conditions of consumer equilibrium. A detailed account of Georgescu-Roegen's argument would be outside the reach of this article; the interested reader may wish to consult Zamagni (1999) and Hands (2006) . It suffices here to briefly mention that Georgescu-Roegen demonstrated that there is no general solution to this problem unless preferences are transitive; however, the assumption of transitivity is unrealistic as it requires consumers to make comparisons over large changes in quantities of goods. This, said
Georgescu-Roegen, is highly unlikely: humans have a "psychological threshold" of perceptions, including valuations of goods. They are not in a position to contemplate and consider the whole 15 choice set but only minor variations among a smaller set of available bundles of goods -"local knowledge" in modern parlance. To take this limitation into account, he suggested a new approach, which he christened the theory of "directional choice" and in which indifference surfaces are not given but evolve endogenously over time depending on the consumer's past experiences of consumption. It is only by experimenting with different goods and combinations of them, that the consumer learns to refine his or her preferences, and adapts choice. This requires, however, a shift in emphasis relative to traditional theory, in which the consumer is supposedly aware of all consumption opportunities and makes the best choice out of them, so that any observed position in the choice space must be an equilibrium position. In directional choice theory, instead, the consumer can be initially in a disequilibrium position and can move from there, so that movements in the choice space are real movements in real time.
Georgescu's analogy, comparing the two theories to the actions of, respectively, a bird and a worm, is illuminating: in conventional theory, "choice is analogous to that of a bird which, after surveying from above a large piece of ground, dives directly at the most preferred spot. In the theory of directional choice, man's choice is rather like that of a worm which, from any position, chooses some direction and then moves along it" (Georgescu 1968a, 255).
Time must be placed at the heart of economic analysis as it is only over a period of time that the consumer can experiment with different goods and allow preferences to evolve.
Later on (1954), Georgescu-Roegen took up lexicographic preferences, plausible insofar as they represent the irreducibility of human needs. Traditional utility theory unifies all sorts of 16 needs by pretending they are interchangeable, so that utility is the notion that summarizes all of them. Still, "he who does not have enough to eat cannot satisfy his hunger by wearing more shirts" (Georgescu-Roegen 1973a, 457). It is better, suggested the author, to move towards a conception that draws attention to a series of distinct wants, rather than just one (utility), following in this the original insight of early marginalist authors from Daniel Bernoulli to Carl
Menger. Because human needs can be ranked on a scale going from the most basic ones (food, drink, shelter) to progressively more sophisticated ones, they will tend to be met in succession:
therefore, consumption choices will follow paths in which basic needs are satisfied first, and other needs come sequentially. As a result, past choices will always affect current choices by determining the starting point, even when preferences themselves do not change. GeorgescuRoegen's defense of lexicographic preferences is another way to regard time as a major determinant of consumer choice, adding strength to the idea that there must be some form of hysteresis, an effect of the time arrow such that past actions are irreversible, at least to an extent. Since lexicographic preferences are not amenable to conventional representations of utility and in fact, are the textbook example of a case in which indifference curves are hardly meaningful, this point reinforces Georgescu-Roegen's mistrust towards conventional utility theory and its analytical tools.
In sum, Georgescu-Roegen's early work on utility and consumption had led him to believe that there was an unmet need for a better way to integrate time (and with it experience, evolving preferences and learning processes) into economic analysis. In his 1968 entry on "Utility" in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, he wrote: "There is little doubt that by far the greatest amount of work still to be done in utility theory concerns the time 17 factor" (Georgescu-Roegen 1968a, 250). More generally, he had grown increasingly dissatisfied with the standard approach to utility, based as it was on the notion of indifference which he considered flawed: in this sense, he believed the shift from the older cardinalist to the newer ordinalist approach with Pareto and his followers had not brought as much improvement as was generally believed.
Insight from Gossen?
How, then, could Georgescu-Roegen avail himself of Gossen in support of his program to develop a theory of directional choice centered on time, experience, and irreversibility? To answer this question, it is first necessary to briefly present Gossen and his contribution, placing emphasis on those aspects that Georgescu-Roegen was most interested in.
The book starts with what commentators, from the late nineteenth century onwards, have taken the habit of calling "Gossen's First Law": a postulate, traditionally interpreted as roughly equivalent to the principle of decreasing marginal utility. Interestingly, however, Gossen stated it first in terms of time rather than quantities of goods: as an activity is pursued continuously over time, the enjoyment it yields decreases steadily until satiety is ultimately reached (Gossen 1983, 6) . The more familiar version, in which marginal utility diminishes with the quantity of goods, is not a primitive principle in Gossen but is derived from the diminishing intensity of utility over time (Gossen 1983, 35) . The latter can be regarded as more general (GeorgescuRoegen 1983, lxxx): it is because Gossen had first defined the psychological relation between utility and time, assumed to hold for any kind of enjoyable activity, that he could subsequently 18 take into account that time is needed to consume commodities -a concern rarely found in modern economics.
The First Law can be represented graphically as a negatively-sloped schedule in a diagram in which time (or quantity of a good) is on the abscissa, and marginal utility on the ordinate (curve cb in Figure 2a ). Georgescu-Roegen who had long discussed the respective merits of ordinalist and cardinalist approaches in his earlier writings (see above) stresses that as originally formulated, Gossen's principles do not need any assumption of cardinality:
"the time represented on the horizontal axis […] need not be clock-time; time as a pure flow ordered only by the subjective relation 'earlier than' will do. Nor need the feelings of pleasure at any moment in life be cardinally measurable; it suffices that these feelings be ordinally comparable" (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, lxxx).
The cb curve can be shifted upwards or downwards with no major consequences on the main result; and it is required only to be downward-sloping without any other restrictions on its shape (though for simplicity's sake, Gossen often assumed linearity). Georgescu-Roegen insisted on the originality of this formulation relative to other versions of the principle of decreasing marginal utility, which assumed cardinality along both the vertical and horizontal axes (1983, lxxx). However, he admitted that the original text of Gossen is at times hesitant and even contradictory on these matters (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, lxxxiv). In particular to compare the utility derived from different goods or enjoyable activities, Gossen reintroduced a form of measurability assuming that "any mathematical magnitude […] consists of atoms and that the atoms can be separated one by one and rearranged at will" (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, lxix).
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Gossen's atomism can be somewhat excused for ignoring the mathematical notion of continuity, not yet known in the mid-nineteenth century; but a more serious inconsistency "was his further assumption that one atom of, say, milk is equal to an atom of, say, coal" (1983, lxix).
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Gossen also provided a simple, clever graphical solution to the question of how to allocate one's time in order to maximize total utility, when several activities are available but time is limited and does not allow reaching satiety for all of them. Again, this is easily generalized to the problem of the optimal allocation of a scarce factor among distinct uses; the fact that Gossen took time as his starting point gives unity to his whole thought, indicating that the origin of scarcity is time alone, and all other material shortages are just consequences of it (GeorgescuRoegen 1983, lxv). Gossen's optimal solution expresses the principle that the end intensities of pleasure in each use must be equal (Gossen 1983, 14) . While the general principle is correct, Gossen's solution is unsatisfactory when it comes to actually comparing the pleasures resulting from qualitatively different enjoyments, as he simply assumed that atoms of any two goods are
equal. Yet he "hit on the correct idea" (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xciv) when, having introduced money and a price system, he drew the conclusion that the last unit of money spent in each enjoyment must provide the same intensity of pleasure. This proposition can be translated algebraically to state that the optimal allocation of income over different goods must be such Georgescu-Roegen's introduction incorrectly suggests that this principle is unique to
Gossen among marginalist writers, and escaped notice by later commentators: "no one is known to have said anything even approaching it before him, or after him, for what matters"
(1983, lxxxiv). However, versions of this law can be found in other early neoclassical economists, most prominently Maffeo Pantaleoni who explicitly attributed it to Gossen (1898, 28-38), and
Mixed results
To summarize, Georgescu-Roegen believed that Gossen's thought centered on time purported a potentially fruitful approach to the question of how utility could change with time, and provided a framework of analysis which, though somewhat primitive, was exempt from the flaws of the ordinalist, indifference-curve based, approach. Gossen's book offered a background for his claim that it was essential to rebuild the foundations of consumer choice theory so as to fully include time and its consequences -experience, learning, and irreversibility. In particular, Georgescu-Roegen saw potential for the Second Law to be developed further, and his effort to prove the general theorem of lifetime enjoyment optimization can be seen as a first step in this direction.
However as already mentioned, Georgescu-Roegen reached no general solution to the problem of optimizing time use over one's lifespan. As mentioned above, a major difficulty was the lack of mathematical and analytical tools that are adequate enough to model dynamic phenomena. Georgescu-Roegen was famously aware of the limitations of mathematics, an issue that he repeatedly raised in the last decades of his life; but he did not go as far as to experiment with alternative tools and remained a traditionalist, so to speak, in terms of methods.
What's more, Gossen's approach did not offer sufficient help to build a convincing case for support of an alternative consumer theory, with respect to the existing approach based on indifference curves. For all its novelty and interest, it was not exempt from all the problems of early marginalism. The aforementioned atomism is a first example of these difficulties; another 24 is the imperfect correspondence between total and marginal utility, which Georgescu-Roegen discussed at length: if it is mathematically straightforward to see that the curve cb corresponds to the marginal concept and the surface below it to the total concept, a substantive interpretation would require some mechanism for "accumulating" utility, so that the notion of total utility would correspond to a real psychological experience. In a sense, then, most of the problems that were open in 1965, when the book project started, were still largely unsolved in 1983, when it finished.
Conclusions
Like Gossen whom he much admired, Georgescu-Roegen was at the forefront of the The Gossen editorial project hardly contributed to reviving awareness of GeorgescuRoegen's approach to utility theory. Its long duration and the numerous practical difficulties encountered throughout the process, together with his growing focus on the new area of bioeconomics, distracted attention from the theoretical issues that had brought him to study Gossen in the first place. By the mid-seventies, it was no longer obvious to all that utility theory, "the topic that has been my liebling thema"
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, was one of his major theoretical interests, and he often felt the need to specify it explicitly ("My first field was utility theory" copies are unavailable for purchase, either from the publisher or from major online retailers.
Google Scholar reports only 68 citations 34 , a tiny number compared to more than 3000 for Georgescu-Roegen's 1971 book on The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, and more than 400 for his 1966 Analytical Economics.
As a result, the book is less remembered today for its contribution to utility theory, than
for Georgescu-Roegen's thoughts on discovery and the place of outliers in the sociology of 
